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Energy, security and EDA
Energy Security
EDA
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Overview
• Part I: Energy life-cycle
– Focus on distribution 
– Smart meters & ICT infrastructure
• Part II: Security architecture
– Risks 
– Security solutions: An example from road toll charging
• Part III: Implementation issues
– Computational security
– Physical security 
– Messages for EDA 
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Part I: Lifecycle of ‘energy’
• Generation: nuclear plants, solar stations, …
• Transmission: 
– from generation to distribution to the users
– Few players: US has three main networks (East, 
West and Texas) 
– goal is to keep the network stable (no matter what). 
Security is related to protocols to share data in case 
of emergency.
• Distribution:
– Electronics needed at end points = Focus
[source: C. Troncoso]
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Our focus: distribution
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Distribution: ICT system
Data generation Data collection
Electricity usage
Billing ratesUser can adapt
consumption
Utility companies
can adapt production
(and billing rates)
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Who wants Smart Meters? Stakeholders
• Government
– Interest
• Energy Problems: CO2 reduction
– Role
• Establishing policies, ensure reliable infrastructure
• Industry (chip manufacturers, GSM providers, energy 
distributors, Google’s)
– Interest
• New business opportunities
– Role
• Provide infrastructure
• Users
– Interest
• Energy economics
– Role
• Using the system but…
• privacy at risk [adapted from: C. Troncoso]
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Part II: Security and privacy
Dutch newspaper (NRC Handelsblad):
“Smart energy meter will not be compulsory”
[http://www.nrc.nl/international/article2207260.ece/Smart_energy_meter_will_not_be_compulsory]
The 'smart energy meter' will not be 
compulsory in the Netherlands. Minister of 
economic affairs Maria van der Hoeven
backed down after consumer groups 
raised privacy concerns.
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Example:
“Save energy
- Save money
- Make a difference”
Scenario 1Scenario 2:
-Local processing
-Less bandwidth
-Privacy friendly
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Smart Meter: Risks
• Example 1: “Your fridge consumes 4 times 
more electricity than average in your 
neighborhood, consider buying a new fridge.”
 can also be inferred locally. 
• Example 2: “You arrive at home around 6pm, 
turn on the lights, start cooking (stove is on). 
Can someone call you about this new fridge 
(during dinner) ?”
 useful information for phone marketing/sales. 
 also useful for burglars and hackers 
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Security Elements in a Smart Meter
• Security protocols
– Confidentiality, authentication, integrity
– Privacy
– Key management
– Secure updates of meters
– …
• Secure implementations
– Efficient implementation of security protocols on 
embedded devices (smart meters)
– Secure implementations, tamperproof, resistant to 
active and passive attacks 
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Similar use case: Road Charging
• Nowadays drivers pay flat fees for driving
• Satellite-based road charging
– Drivers pay according to their road use
– On-Board Unit (OBU) collects GPS location data
– Typical policy: fee depends on road and time
• Main applications so far:
– Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD): insurance companies
– Public Road Pricing: European Electronic Toll Service (EETS)
• Straightforward architecture
– OBU sends location data to Service Provider
– Privacy issues: fine-grained location data disclosed
[slides courtesy: Josep Balasch]
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EETS straightforward implementation
Toll 
Price Policy
(time/location
of car)
OBU location  TSP
TSP does billing 
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PrETP - Privacy Friendly Toll Pricing 
OBU does pricing locally
OBU total fee  TSP
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PrETP – Verifying Security Concerns
• No personal data leaves the domain of the user!
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Law enforcement
• Technical means do not suffice
– OBU in hands of the user
• Instead technology can help:
– Detect vehicles with inactive OBUs
– Detect vehicles reporting false location data
– Detect vehicles using incorrect road prices
– Detect vehicles reporting false final fees
• Combination of law + technology
[slide courtesy: C. Troncoso]
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Apply to smart meter
• Technical means do not suffice
– ‘Smart meter’ in hands of the user
• Instead technology can help:
– Detect homes with inactive smart meters
– Detect smart meters reporting false energy data
– Detect smart meters using incorrect energy rates
– Detect smart meters reporting false final fees
– . . . 
• Combination of law + technology
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Embedded Solution
• Focus on normal mode of operation
• Focus on feasibility for embedded platform
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[slides courtesy: Josep Balasch]
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Embedded Solution
• OBU elements
• Minimize cost:
– Off-the-shelf hardware components
– Free licensed software tools
BATTERY
GPS RECEIVER
PROCESSING UNIT
PROCESSOR
INTERNAL MEMORY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC LIBRARY
EXTERNAL MEMORY
POLICY
ROAD MAPS
ENCRYPTED GPS
DRIVER INTERFACE
GSM MODEM
NXP LPC2388 (ARM7)TELIT GM862-GPS SD CARD OpenStreetMap
[slides courtesy: Josep Balasch]
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Performance
• Test Scenario
– Compressed road map of 
Belgium in SD Card
– Cryptographic RSA keys 
2048 bits
– Constraint: process data 
upon GPS reception
• Timing results
– One hour journey 
(one GPS string/sec)
OPERATION TIME @ 72 MHz
REAL-TIME Map-Matching 0.328 seconds
OFF-LINE
Premium Calculation
GPS Encryption
0.096 seconds
10.691 seconds
Encrypt Premium 6.445 seconds
[slides courtesy: Josep Balasch]
Ingrid Verbauwhede, K.U.Leuven - COSIC
KULeuven - COSIC DAC Smart Grid, Smart Meter, CA – 21 June 2010 
Part III: Design methods to support trust 
in constrained devices
• Covered just one use case, i.e. privacy of the end-user
There are many more security requirements: 
authentication, encryption, .. 
• Demonstrated feasibility on an embedded processor 
In general: building security into ICT systems need:
– building blocks for cryptography
– building blocks for physical trust
– Security protocols
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Embedded Security
NEED BOTH
• Efficient, lightweight implementations
– Within power, area, timing budgets
– Public key: 2048 bits RSA, 200 bit ECC on 8 bit C and 100 W
– Public key on a passive RFID tag 
• Trustworthy implementation
– Resistant to attacks
– Active attacks: probing, power glitches, JTAG scan chain
– Passive attacks: side channel attacks
1
2
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Security vs. efficiency
• Computational security: number of bits
– ECRYPT Yearly Report on Algorithms and Key Lengths (2010 
version)
• Ex. Road tolling: cryptographic commitments 
– Each segment has assigned a price per Km pi
– This price is specified by the policy, assuming:
pi = ƒ ( type road, time day )
Payment Tuple 1 Payment Tuple 2 Payment Tuple 3
[slides courtesy: Josep Balasch]
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Security vs. efficiency
• Cryptographic commitments: several modular multi-
exponentiations over large numbers
• OBU platform: NXP ARM7 microcontroller (32 bit) / SW
• Highest level of security cannot (yet) drive on German highway
Security
Operation
Low
(512 bit)
Normal
(1024 bit)
High
(2048 bit)
Map-Matching 839.11 s
One segment 1.80 s 7.88 s 47.79 s
Max. Speed 1530 km/h 350 km/h 57 km/h
OBU timings and speed tolerance for a 1-hour journey
[slides courtesy: Josep Balasch]
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Physical Security
Static CMOS tells everything it is doing!
2
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Insecure ECC implementation
ECC point multiplication
In: point P, key k (l bits)
Output: Q = k.P
for j = 0 to l – 1
Q = 2.Q /* double */
if (bit j of k) is 1 
then
Q = Q + P /* add */
Return Q
j < (l-1)
Loop Init
bit j of k = 1?
Q = Q+P
j = j + 1
Return Q Q = 2Q
Side-Channel
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Physical security
• Physically Observable Cryptography: standard “theoretical” basic 
assumptions do no longer hold
• But how do you measure the security of "Physically Observable 
Cryptography"? No real consensus yet ..
– Information leakage
– Measurements until disclosure
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Solution approaches
• Example 1: “Provable physical security”= 
provably secure constructions under “physical 
assumptions”
– e.g. “constrained side-channels attacks are possible”
– e.g. “tamper resistant primitives exist”
• Example 2: Side-channel resistant circuit styles 
integrated in standard cell place & route
– e.g. Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL)
Ingrid Verbauwhede, K.U.Leuven - COSIC
KULeuven - COSIC DAC Smart Grid, Smart Meter, CA – 29 June 2010 
(EDA) design challenges
• Physical trust can be achieved with 
countermeasures, but most are ad hoc. 
– A countermeasure against one attack can open door 
to another attack (See HOST 2010 next door, 
Monday morning, 9am)
• Need a holistic design approach
• Start from trust anchors = roots of trust
• Build-up a security application
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Conclusions
• Security challenges:
– Many players in the field: government, business and customers
– Different stakeholders have different interests; when these are 
conflicting or contradicting, security issues may arise
– In-depth security analysis required
• Smart meter, smart grid can learn from other ICT 
security applications:
– Privacy in social networks, in road-tolling and other ICT 
applications  
– Implementations will need Physical Security and Tamper 
resistance
– Network issues
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